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Ever since Thaler and Sunstein published 
their influential Nudge, the book and the 
theory it presents have received great praise 
and opposition. Nudge-theory, and more 
particularly, nudging may be considered an 
additional strategy providing some novel 
instruments to the already rich governance 
toolbox. But what is its value? The current 
debates on Nudge-theory are often highly 
normative or ideologically driven and pay 
limited attention to more practical aspects 
of the theory: Whether and how is nudging 
evaluable as a theory and a practice? 
Whether there is solid evidence available of 
nudge success over other governance 
interventions? What is to be considered a 
nudge success at all? What data and 
evaluative techniques may assist in evaluating 
nudging beyond individual cases? The 
current article seeks to explore these 
questions.
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University 
Mark Kosters, Australian Government, Office of Best Practice Regulation and 
Deregulation Policy Division 
 
Introduction 
It is not often that a book on governance interventions becomes a bestseller, but Richard Thaler and 
Cass Sunstein’s Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness (‘Nudge’) has. 
Published in 20081, the book outlines the seemingly immense potential for more innovative and less 
coercive government interventions to shape people’s behaviour. It was considered to be ‘Best Book of 
the Year, 2008’ by both The Economist and The Financial Times. This is an extraordinary 
achievement compared to all books published yearly on governance interventions that remain in their 
publishers’ warehouses and get read by, at best, a handful of in-group specialist scholars.  
The success story continues. Not only is Nudge well read, it is also well applied. As former 
Administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Obama 
administration, Sunstein has had much opportunity to spread his ideas and apply them to real-world 
policy matters. 2  On the other side of the Atlantic, in 2010, the UK Government installed the 
Behavioural Insight Team (BIT), or ‘Nudge Unit’, to apply insights from academic research in 
behavioural economics and psychology to public policy and services — Thaler acts in an advisory 
capacity in the BIT. In short, the BIT builds on Nudge-theory to improve public policy and services 
(BIT, 2013). Nudge-theory has taken such an enormous flight in the UK that some critical scholars 
already talk of a ‘nudgeocracy’ (Whitehead et al., 2012: 303) — although these claims seem a little far 
reaching, as nudging does not appear to be a dominant governance strategy in the UK (Dorey, 2014; 
Richards et al., 2014). On mainland Europe, Nudge-theory has gained attention in France, Germany 
and from the European Commission, with the latter having installed a Behavioural Studies for 
European Policies Program in 2010. Interestingly, the UK BIT in its turn has inspired the Obama 
administration to install its own Behavioral Insight Team, which is already nicknamed the ‘Nudge 
Squad’ by the US media (Fox News, 2013). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In this article, we work with the 2009 paperback edition of the book (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009). 
2  Cass Sunstein joined the White House as Administrator of the White House Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs after publishing Nudge. Here his focus was on better regulation, not the application of 
behavioural insights per se. Yet, President Obama’s interest in nudging has been well-documented (Legett, 
2014). 
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In reading the background information on this UK Unit, EU Program and US Squad, one comparable 
issue stands out: it is considered that Nudge-theorising ‘allows policy-makers to better understand 
and influence people's behaviour’(European Commission, 2013), which will ‘help [to] design public 
policies that work better, cost less, and help people to achieve their goals’.3 These oft repeated 
expectations on nudging by policymakers and administrators are especially striking because the 
evidence base of its success as documented in the academic and grey literature is, to say the least, 
disputed, as we will further discuss in this article. Nudge-theory appears to have started from 
empirical observations of a series of experiments with governance instruments (a mechanism), but 
has quickly achieved the normative status of a governance wonder nostrum (a virtue) able to solve 
problems arising from earlier direct and coercive governance interventions. Such a move from a 
governing mechanism to a governing virtue is not unique to Nudge-theory. A similar trend can be 
uncovered for, for instance, the new public management movement (Pollit, 1995), which was 
popularised by the immensely influential book Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial 
Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler (1992). 
There is, of course, nothing wrong with policymakers believing in the virtues of a new type of 
governance intervention, but we argue for some care in considering nudging to be a virtue only. That 
is not to say that we rank ourselves amongst those who are very critical of Nudge-theory and consider 
it to, potentially, do more harm than good (e.g. Bradbury et al., 2013; Goodwin, 2012; Pinch, 2010; 
Selinger and Whyte, 2011). We argue that Nudge-theory lacks a sufficient evidence base for either of 
these somewhat polarised points of view. We further argue that Nudge-theory lacks a solid evaluative 
framework, which makes it difficult to assess whether nudging as a governance intervention 
outperforms other governance interventions, under what circumstances and why.  
Preparatory to future evaluation of real-world scenarios of nudging, this article therefore seeks to 
answer four related questions: Whether and how is nudging evaluable as a theory and a practice? 
What may be considered nudging success? To what extent is solid evidence available of nudge 
success? What data and evaluative techniques may assist in evaluating nudging beyond individual 
cases? In order to answer these questions, we first seek to better understand Nudge-theory, critiques 
of the theory, and first insights into the performance of nudging in real-world settings. 
What exactly is a nudge? 
The central premise behind Thaler and Sunstein’s nudges is that individuals are not ‘Econs’. In other 
words, people frequently behave in a way that economic theory finds difficult to predict (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2009: 7). It is, of course, not a novel insight that people do not act in their own best interest 
from an economics point of view. In 1973, Herbert Simon was awarded a Nobel Prize for his classic 
work on bounded rationality (Simon, 1945), which argues that people are unable to make 
3The Obama Administration document referring to the possible instalment of a Behavioral Insight Team was first 
made public by FoxNews, see:  http://www.foxnews.com/politics/interactive/2013/07/30/behavioral-insights-team-
document/ (accessed: 22 August, 2013) 
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economically optimal decisions because they lack the capacity to store the voluminous information 
needed for such decisions, as well as the cognitive ability to process that information. More recently, 
influential behavioural scientists such as Daniel Kahneman (2011), Roberto Cialdini (2009), and Dan 
Ariely (2008) have evidenced what for a long time has been common knowledge: people do things 
that are not in their own best interest even when they are aware of this (bounded willpower), or that 
people do so because they consider benevolent behaviour as more fair than selfish behaviour 
(bounded self-interest). 
Despite this long history of pointing out that ‘Homo Economicus is a fiction’ (Leonard, 2008: 356–357) 
law, and specifically the economic analysis of legal rules, has been hampered by its focus on the 
substance of the rules (i.e. how they are written) and their function (i.e. how they should operate) 
rather than being concerned with how people respond to them (Bardach and Kagan, 1982; Jolls et al., 
1998; Sparrow, 2000; Supiot, 2007). In an analysis that predates Nudge, Thaler and Sunstein, along 
with Christine Jolls, suggest that while behavioural insights challenge the ‘simplicity and parsimony’ of 
conventional economic analysis of legal rules, they can provide a more accurate prediction of the 
likely behavioural response to legal rules (Jolls et al., 1998: 1487–1488).  
In Nudge, the focus shifts from employing behavioural insights as a prognosticator of human 
behavioural response to being key in the practice of shaping that behaviour. This application of 
behavioural insights is what Thaler and Sunstein refer to as changing the ‘choice architecture’ of 
those governed. To them, the answer to the question ‘why nudge?’ is that the application of 
behavioural insight should result in more effective governing and, in doing so, make people happier. 
For government, the answer is similar in some respects, in that effective governance, policies and 
regulations are obviously preferred over ineffective ones. Nudge also represents a welcome respite 
from the inherent tensions of a deregulatory agenda, which is often criticised for not having achieved 
its desired outcomes (cf. John and Richardson, 2012). This all has created a call for innovative 
governance interventions (Van der Heijden, 2013), and we consider nudging one such intervention. 
Further, in the current climate of fiscal restraint, Nudge’s potential to offer ‘low cost’ solutions to some 
of the more complicated governance problems has been a strong factor in winning the support of the 
US and UK governments, respectively (BBC Radio 4, 2013). 
Nudge: a somewhat flexible definition 
Nudge presents a series of truisms and well-selected research examples to illustrate that individuals 
are not ‘Econs’, and to support the central claim of the book that changes in ‘choice architecture’ may 
help them to improve their decisions about health, wealth and happiness. But what exactly is a 
nudge? Thaler and Sunstein provide us with a somewhat flexible definition in the introduction to the 
book: 
A nudge, as we will use the term, is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters 
people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly 
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changing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must 
be cheap and easy to avoid. Nudges are not mandates. Putting fruit at eye level 
[hoping that people then choose fruit over unhealthy alternatives] counts as a nudge. 
Banning junk food does not (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009: 6). 
Throughout the remainder of the book, Thaler and Sunstein (2009) describe a nudge as the 
application of insights from behavioural economics in government policy as a substitute for more 
conventional coercive interventions such as command and control regulation. This makes their work 
sit in the broader governance literature that is interested in new and innovative instruments that seek 
to steer (‘govern’) human behaviour towards desired ends (for reviews of the literature, see Bell and 
Hindmoor, 2009; Chhotray and Stoker, 2010).The examples selected by Thaler and Sunstein do, 
however, cause more confusion than clarity about what a nudge exactly is. 
Looking at the examples discussed by Thaler and Sunstein, it becomes clear that nudges can be 
implemented by a wide range of actors, come in a wide range of forms, and seek to achieve a wide 
range of outcomes. For one, it seems that anyone can nudge —government can nudge (e.g. to lower 
rates of teenage pregnancy, governments may pay teenage girls one dollar each day they are not 
pregnant), business can nudge (e.g. to improve health outcomes and reduce pay-outs, medical 
insurers may offer financial incentives for members who undertake prescribed activities to improve 
their health) and individuals can nudge themselves (e.g. in order to quit smoking, a person can set 
aside a given amount of money for six months and only gets the money returned if a test for nicotine 
is passed; if not, the money is donated to charity). Also, nudges seek to change behaviour through a 
wide range of interventions. They can seek to change behaviour through a financial incentive (as per 
the above examples of medical insurance, or teenage pregnancy), through providing relevant 
information (e.g. to improve energy efficiency, air conditioners come with a bright red light to signal 
that the filter needs to be changed) or even by actively blocking an inappropriate choice (e.g. to 
prevent sending an email that the sender will later regret, computers filter outgoing messages for 
strong language, which if detected blocks the message for 24 hours). Finally, nudges may seek to 
achieve substantially different outcomes. They can provoke a single response (i.e. change the air 
conditioner filter, rewrite an email), prompt a more long-lasting behavioural change (quit smoking) or 
both (i.e. sign up for gym membership to improve health).  
Betting on two horses? 
What strikes us is that the common, distinguishing feature of these nudges is not clear. There does 
not seem to be an obvious common denominator that truly defines nudges as a different approach to 
steering individuals’ behaviour than other governance interventions — may these be implemented by 
governments, non-governments or a collaboration of both (for examples, see Chhotray and Stoker, 
2010). How exactly do nudges based on financial incentives differ from traditional governmental 
interventions such as subsidies, grants or taxes? How exactly do nudges based on blocking an 
inappropriate choice differ from traditional restrictive regulation? How exactly are nudges based on 
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information supply different from a range of informational instruments that have been trialled with by 
governments for decades now?   
This heterogeneity of Thaler and Sunstein’s definition has resulted in some criticism of an 
overstretching and fuzziness of nudging as a concept (e.g. Hausman and Welch, 2010; Selinger and 
Whyte, 2011). In addition, nudging as discussed by Thaler and Sunstein can be one of two things. 
First, it can be a governance intervention that seeks to assist individuals to make choices that are in 
their own best interest (i.e. saving more for retirement, choosing the right insurance plan) — referred 
to as ‘type 1 nudges’ in what follows. Second, it can be a governance intervention that seeks to steer 
individuals’ behaviour to achieve a desired collective end (e.g. reducing crime, encouraging 
environmentally-friendly practices) — referred to as ‘type 2 nudges’. Of course, there are synergies 
between the two (i.e. individual benefits such as quitting smoking may reduce future government 
outlays on interventions, such as the cost of healthcare), yet distinguishing among them will be of 
essence in evaluating nudging. The two interventions, after all, seek to achieve significantly different 
goals. 
To say the least, all this vagueness will not help policymakers (and academics alike) to gain a better 
understanding of where, when and why nudging may be expected to result in desired outcomes. Nor 
is it likely that it will help to better understand whether nudging results in more optimal outcomes than 
other governance interventions. In other words, nudging as defined and illustrated by Thaler and 
Sunstein is difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate because of their seemingly all-inclusive 
understanding of the governance intervention they seek to capture. Scholars seeking to evaluate 
nudges are, we feel, forced to redefine the exact meaning of nudging in their own studies.  
Nudge critique, or are these unevaluated fears? 
Nudge-theory has not been without its critics (e.g. Bradbury et al., 2013; Goodwin, 2012; Pinch, 2010; 
Selinger and Whyte, 2011; White, 2013). Some have warned of its capacity to ‘sow the seeds of an 
illiberal system of control’ and that its effectiveness relies on factors which are difficult to predict 
(Baldwin et al., 2011: 124–125). In 2011, the UK Science and Technology Committee concluded that 
regulatory experiments, such as those being trialled by the BIT, were unlikely to be effective in 
isolation and did not appear to be supported by appropriate evidence (Science and Technology 
Committee, 2011). In a follow-up report on the BIT in 2014, the Committee states to be ‘impressed by 
their work in pioneering the use of randomised controlled trials to determine the effectiveness of 
[behavioural] interventions’, but is still concerned ‘that robust data [on the effectiveness of such 
interventions] is not always available in the public domain to substantiate [claims made by the Unit on 
the success of such interventions] (Science and Technology Committee, 2014: 1). BIT Director David 
Halpern observed that the initial resistance from the UK bureaucracy and media to his work in the Unit 
has abated, but there remain areas within the UK government which do not support it (Halpern, 2012). 
Further, Sunstein has since resigned from his OIRA position, with some suggesting that his efforts to 
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‘test his theories of human behaviour and economic efficiency in the laboratory of the federal 
government’ have left both business and consumer groups disappointed and done ‘untold damage’ 
(Broder, 2012). Although the effectiveness of nudging as a governance intervention is questioned 
(see also Section 4), Nudge-theory is mostly critiqued for its political stance. Most fierce critiques 
address the legitimacy, accountability and transparency of nudging. But what is the evaluative base of 
these critiques? 
Nudging legitimacy 
Setting defaults and making decisions on behalf of citizens is not without risk. The most common 
critique is that Nudge-theory, and especially its underlying political philosophy of libertarian 
paternalism, violates the principles of individual freedom. After all, under a nudge regime individuals 
are no longer able to make their own choice, so goes the arguments of critical scholars, but are 
nudged in making the ‘right’ choice by government (Bradbury et al., 2013; Brown, 2012; Goodwin, 
2012). In these situations, the choice depends on a subjective assessment (the choice architect’s 
‘conception of the good’), which may be subject to personal bias and motivations (Baldwin et al., 
2011). A counterargument is, of course, that any policy that seeks to change behaviour or a societal 
desired collective end will have to make choices about the type of behaviour desired, the social end 
required and the governance intervention that is expected to be most likely to achieve such goals. In 
other words, any policy and its related governance intervention(s) will have to set out a choice for the 
citizen — even when developed in close collaboration with the citizens it seeks to govern (Van der 
Heijden and Ten Heuvelhof, 2012). 
Another concern relates to the quantum of choices made available to decision makers (i.e. those 
nudged) and affected by those in governing positions (i.e. those nudging). In Nudge, Thaler and 
Sunstein rail against the policy design for a Swedish savings programme and a US prescription 
subsidy plan. Both plans sought to provide individuals more choice than they had under former 
governance interventions (see further Section 4). Thaler and Sunstein (2009) claim that both 
interventions were seriously flawed due to what they call the  ‘just maximise choice’ mantra (161). 
Based on these two carefully selected examples, the inference is made that limiting choice is 
desirable over maximising choice. This, however, raises questions unanswered in Nudge. For 
example, is there a role for government in restricting the number of options on offer for a particular 
product (through regulation, or another governance intervention) or should it be self-regulated by 
market players? If so, how would this restriction be implemented and enforced? What is the right 
number of choice options? Further, what are the implications of restricting choice on the market (e.g. 
less competition, reduced innovation) and for consumers (i.e. some consumers may find they are no 
longer able to find products that meet their specific needs)? While ‘maximising choice’ may paralyse 
those subject to nudging as a governance instrument, the alternative of limiting choice appears 
problematic as well. Also, research has pointed out that choice architecture does not work out 
similarly for governed actors from different socio-economic back grounds — that is, less affluent 
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actors appear to make poorer choices than affluent actors (Bradbury et al., 2013). This calls into 
question whether nudging is an inclusive or exclusive governance intervention. 
Nudging accountability and transparency 
Besides, the covert nature of nudges calls has raised questions as to whether nudges provide 
sufficient transparency and accountability (Baldwin et al., 2011). For example, if governments employ 
Nudge-type instruments to influence choices at a subconscious level, particularly to prompt the 
governed actors to choose something other than what they would normally have chosen, it may be 
counter-intuitive to call these actors’ attention to governments’ intent or method. BIT Director Halpern 
acknowledges this weakness by arguing that ‘tacit acceptance’ is required from the public (Halpern, 
2012). Yet, once the public has given permission to be nudged, government has a broad mandate 
which obviates the need to seek separate permission for each nudge. This requires considerable trust 
on the part of the citizen that such a mandate will not be misused. Yet again, this holds true for almost 
any government-led governance intervention. 
Thaler and Sunstein (2009) also argue that transparency is essential. The key to this is constraining 
nudges to governance interventions that government must be able and willing to defend publicly. 
However, what the government and its constituents consider ‘defensible’ may not accord. Without 
disclosure this cannot be contested. Without transparency, the accountability of nudging is also 
suspect. This is not just about the absence of disclosure, but also ‘the possibility of debate, of 
questions by the forum and answers by the actor, and eventually of judgement of the actor by the 
forum’ (Bovens, 2010: 951). This absence of such safeguards can reduce incentives for bureaucrats 
to fix mistakes (thereby entrenching poor policy) and, more importantly, for ‘public officials or public 
organisations [to] remain on the virtuous path’ (Bovens, 2010: 954). 
Evaluating the critique: do the fears hold in the real-world? 
Although we agree with such criticism, our stance is, as already highlighted, that it applies to other 
governance interventions as well (cf. Baldwin et al., 2011; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; Power, 1999). In 
both highly coercive governance interventions, such as command and control, and low coercive 
governance interventions, such as government-led voluntary programs (Croci, 2005; Lyon and 
Maxwell, 2000), those in a governing position make choices on behalf of those governed. We 
consider nudging as ‘just another’ governance strategy providing some additional instruments to the 
governance toolbox. The application of any of these, nudge-based or otherwise, needs careful 
consideration, evaluation and discussion with the public to ensure legitimate use. Further, to date, 
nudging has been confined to, at the very best, a limited role. The criticisms in the literature to 
nudging legitimacy, accountability and transparency do have a point, but the extent to which it is 
critiqued (e.g. by considering the UK a ‘nudgeocracy’, Whitehead et al., 2012: 303) is out of step with 
the real-world implementation of Nudge-theory. Besides, as we further discuss in Section 4, in real-
world settings, predominantly type-2 nudges are implemented (i.e. those seeking to achieve a desired 
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collective end), and often only as an addition to more traditional governance interventions such as 
direct regulation, subsidies or taxes. In other words, the fears make for great opinion pieces and 
thought experiments, but they hardly materialise in real-world settings. 
That having been said, the critical discussions on nudging provide for some intriguing evaluation 
criteria and questions. First is the question of how effective and efficient nudges are in achieving their 
desired ends. But other questions are of relevance as well. How is nudging legitimised in real-world 
settings? How transparent and accountable are nudging strategies in real-world settings? The readers 
of this journal will be very aware of the literature that discusses the complications of using these 
various criteria in assessing any policy, or governance strategy and instrument. However, it also 
points out a vantage point to address this challenge (e.g. Armstrong, 2005; Bovens, 1998; Bovens et 
al., 2008; Hodge, 2000; Lundqvist, 1988; Power, 1999; Verhoest et al., 2007). 
Evaluating nudging: success and failure 
An area where one would expect active evaluation of nudging is whether nudges indeed result in their 
desired outcomes. Indeed, Nudge-theory has been the centre of a range of tests, trials and 
evaluations. Table 1 provides a summary of those we discuss here. 
Table 1 – A range of reported nudging tests, trials and evaluations 
 
Nudge + type Context Country Outcome Reference 
Type 2, Differences 
in information 
provided; differences 
in pre-set donation 
choices 
Money donations. UK Highly positive (270% 
difference) 
Cabinet 
Office, 2013a 
Type 2, Religious 
thoughts versus non-
such thoughts 
Money donations. Canada Highly positive (230% 
difference) 
Shariff and 
Norenzayan, 
2007 
Type 2, Opting out 
(versus opting in) 
Organ donation. Sweden, 
Austria, 
Denmark, 
Netherlands  
Highly positive 
(60–85% difference) 
Johnson and 
Goldstein, 
2013 
Type 2, Opting out 
(versus opting in) 
Charitable giving. UK Positive (43% 
increase) 
Cabinet 
Office, 2013a 
Type 2, Personalised 
information 
Repayment of court 
fines 
UK Positive (30% 
increase) 
Gallagher, 
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2012 
Type 2, Simplifying 
letters 
Paying outstanding 
tax liabilities 
UK Positive (30% 
increase) 
Gallagher, 
2012 
Type 2, Clean urban 
environment versus 
non-clean 
environment 
Littering and stealing NL Positive (25–35% 
difference) 
Keizer, 2012 
Type 2, Information 
on comparative 
behaviour (close 
peers versus distant 
peers) 
Household tax 
payments 
UK Somewhat positive 
(10% difference) 
Cabinet 
Office, 2012 
Type 2, Upfront 
signature 
Reporting travelling 
miles to insurer 
US Somewhat positive 
(10% increase) 
Cabinet 
Office, 2012 
Type 2, House-to-
house information on 
food-waste recycling 
Food waste UK Somewhat positive 
(3% increase) 
Nomura et. 
al., 2011 
Type 2, Message 
design 
Organ donation UK Somewhat positive 
(1% increase, 
depending on 
message) 
Cabinet 
Office, 2013b 
Type 1, Information 
on comparative risk 
versus information 
on absolute risk 
Breast cancer US Likely positive 
(inferred from medical 
study) 
Lipkus et. al., 
2005 
Type 1, Presenting 
healthy food 
attractively 
Choosing healthy 
food 
US Mixed (23% 
improvement for 
vegetables, but 7% 
decrease for starchy 
vegetables) 
Hanks et. al., 
2013 
Type 2, Information 
on comparative 
behaviour 
Energy use US Mixed (5% 
improvement of 
under-performers’ 
behaviour; 8% 
decrease of over-
performers’ 
Schultz et. al., 
2007 
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behaviour) 
Type 1, Media 
campaign 
Retirement savings Sweden Negative (unknown 
how negative) 
Thaler and 
Sunstein, 
2009 
Type 1, Forced 
selection 
Choosing a 
prescription subsidy 
plan 
US Negative (unknown 
how negative) 
Thaler and 
Sunstein, 
2009 
Type 2, High, low 
and no token reward 
for desired behaviour 
Doing volunteer work Israel Highly negative for 
low token (35% 
decrease); Somewhat 
negative for high 
token (8% decrease) 
Gneezy and 
Rustichini, 
2000 
Note: the table by no means claims to provide a representative sample of all nudging trials and 
experiments. It is presented for illustrative purposes only. 
Success stories 
In reviewing the literature on nudging trials and experiments, a range of nudging success stories can 
be uncovered. To give a mosaic of findings, the example frequently cited is a comparative study of 
organ donation arrangements across European countries (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003). This study 
showed that countries where donors are given the choice to ‘opt out’ (i.e. consent to donate is 
presumed) have significantly higher proportion of donors — ranging from 85.9% in Sweden to 99.98% 
in Austria — compared to countries where donors are given the choice to ‘opt in’ — from 4.25% in 
Denmark to 27.5% in the Netherlands. A BIT trial has evaluated the use of text messages on the 
repayment of court fines, including whether different wording affected response rates. The trial found 
that personalised information (i.e. including the person’s name) resulted in a higher response than a 
standard message (33% compared to 25%) and higher repayments (by approximately 30%). The 
BIT’s theory is that personalised information increases the salience of a message, thereby improving 
the likelihood of the desired response (Gallagher, 2012). A large trial in the US found that positioning 
the signature box at the start of a form (rather than the end) prompted a more honest response 
(Cabinet Office, 2012). In this case, customers were required to report the number of miles on an 
insurance form (the more miles reported, the higher the premium). Those required to sign at the start 
of the form reported travelling 10% more miles than those who signed at the end. Another BIT trial 
found that simplifying letters could significantly increase response rates (35% compared to the 
generic letter’s result of 4%). In this case, letters prompting doctors and dentists to pay outstanding 
tax liabilities were found to be more effective if the consequences of non-payment were made more 
explicit (rather than buried in the text), key messages were highlighted and the letter made shorter 
(Gallager, 2012).  
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Further, women were found to be more concerned about developing breast cancer when informed 
about their comparative risk as distinguished from their absolute risk (Lipkus et al., 2005). Students 
were found to be more likely to choose vegetables when these were presented attractively (Hanks et 
al., 2013). Or, giving consumers feedback on their relative energy consumption in the form of a card 
with a ‘smiley’ for those who consumed less than average and a ‘frownie’ for those who consumed 
more than average was found to result in overall energy reduction (Schultz et al., 2007). A similar trial 
encouraging people to pay their taxes in the UK found that the basis of the norm was also significant. 
Specifically, higher responses were received when households’ performance was compared against 
the town average (83%) than if compared against a broader population, such as the average for the 
postcode area (79%) or nation (72.5%) (Cabinet Office, 2012). Other examples come from the fields 
of transportation (Gaker et al., 2010) and food waste (Nomura et al., 2011) and report similar positive 
results. All these examples build on the explication of biases, assuming that people will respond 
accordingly when biases are triggered.  
Also, demonstrated normative values for one behaviour can indirectly influence other behaviours. A 
trial in the Netherlands found that people were less likely to litter (33% compared to 69%) and less 
likely to steal (13% compared to 27%) in an environment free of graffiti (Keizer, 2012). Conversely, 
signage which highlighted that a certain activity was prohibited (in this case, littering) actually 
increased levels of that activity (61% without signs compared to 70% with signs), suggesting that, with 
signage, people become more aware that others are acting inappropriately (Keizer, 2012). Also, 
people were found more inclined to donate money when triggered to think about something religious 
(Shariff and Norenzayan, 2007). In another trial, people were found more inclined to help a passer-by 
if they observe someone nearby sweeping a street (Keizer, 2012). 
Stories of lesser success 
Despite the mosaic of success stories just presented, some studies present less positive results. An 
interesting example comes from an Israeli study (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000). Students were asked 
to participate in volunteering work. Those agreeing were split in three groups. One group was given a 
financial token reward for volunteering, one group was given a large token reward, and one group 
was given no reward at all (the control group). It was found that both groups that received a token 
reward underperformed in their task as compared to the control group, with the group receiving a 
small token showing a 35% underperformance and the group receiving a large token showing an 
underperformance of 7%. Various studies have reported similar results: that rewarding people for 
desired behaviour that they initially did on a voluntary basis undermined their willingness to continue 
doing so because they considered the reward insufficient for the effort the desired behaviour takes 
(Kamenica, 2012; Pink, 2009).  
A slightly different example is presented by Thaler and Sunstein (2009). They use two cases to 
highlight that changing the ‘choice architecture’ is not always done effectively by governments. In 
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Sweden, citizens who did not choose their own retirement savings plan were automatically enrolled 
into a default plan, but the government funded an extensive media campaign urging people to make 
their own choice. In the US, rather than selecting a single default on the basis of merit, eligible 
citizens who did not choose their own prescription subsidy plan were assigned to a randomly selected 
plan. In both cases, the results were far from optimal. By carefully selecting these two cases, Thaler 
and Sunstein seek to demonstrate that, even where a default makes sense, governments still want 
individuals to make their own choice, even at the risk of poor outcomes. According to Thaler and 
Sunstein, the implication of this is that governments should be less averse to setting defaults and 
embrace a more paternalistic role in the decision-making process.  
Another way of looking at these two examples Thaler and Sunstein use is that different incentive 
strategies should not be mixed too much. Whilst individually strategies may hold much promise for 
results, combined they may undo one another’s positive outcomes. Nudges may also cause a 
boomerang effect. For example, households who learn that their energy consumption is lower than 
the average may start consuming more as their bias of being a (too) good citizen may be triggered. 
The earlier discussed study that used ‘smileys’ to reward desired behaviour and ‘frownies’ to 
discipline non-desired behaviour found exactly this (Schultz et al., 2007). Even more, the BIT has 
acknowledged that, on occasion, interventions which they intuitively thought should work were found 
to be ‘ineffective or even harmful’ (Haynes et al., 2012: 17). The potential for adverse impacts from 
nudges was also highlighted by the UK Science and Technology Committee (2011). 
Shortfalls in current nudging evaluations 
Intriguingly, positive findings on the nudge trials and experiments reviewed are often presented by 
mentioning the many caveats of the trials and experiments, as well as their limitations. This may partly 
explain the differences in the reported success stories and the experienced over-all success (or for 
that matter, lack thereof) of nudging (cf. Science and Technology Committee, 2014). After all, such 
warnings may easily be ignored by those in favour for nudging (overlooking warnings that go against 
one's ideological preferences is not unheard of,  Kahneman, 2011; Rose, 2011), whilst they may be 
overly emphasised by those opposing nudging as a governance instrument (which again is not 
unheard of, Kahneman, 2011; Rose, 2011). The same holds for using these evaluations’ findings. 
Take, for instance, a ‘classic’ nudging experiment on students’ choice of food in a school cafeteria. In 
Nudge, Thaler and Sunstein (2009) predict that students will choose healthy food over less healthy 
alternatives if healthy food is presented as the attractive alternative. A recent evaluation of exactly this 
setting (Hanks et al., 2013) indeed reports considerable success. When vegetables were presented 
as the attractive alternative over a less healthy alternative, students were 23% more likely to choose 
vegetables than in the control situation (i.e. vegetables not being presented as attractive). At first 
glance, this is a great success story. Yet, in reading a bit further, it becomes clear that the 23% 
relative increase corresponds with an 8.2% absolute increase: in the control situation 35.8% of 
students chose vegetables, while in the test setting 44% did — leaving the majority in both groups 
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choosing the unhealthy option. A critic may argue that an 8.2% change is marginal at best, whilst 
proponents may argue that an 8.2% increase at hardly any (governance) cost is an impressive 
success indeed. 
One of the main caveats noted is that nudges that are evidenced to work for one group or in one 
context should by no means be expected to also work for another group or in another context 
(Hausman and Welch, 2010; Michie and West, 2013; Willis, 2013). Nudge effectiveness appears 
highly context dependent. Indeed, Thaler (2012) and Sunstein (BBC Radio 4, 2013) acknowledge that 
interventions that worked in one locality may not work in another. Even more, much of the nudging 
literature reports on experimental settings, based on relatively small and often homogenous samples 
(i.e. a small group of students within a similar school or university to test the impact of a financial 
token reward). However, it remains at question whether the positive findings from such experiments 
can be truly extrapolated to hypothetical large-scale governance settings. It is a far extrapolation from, 
say, an experiment that shows that people are willing to carry out a simple task for a token reward, 
such as solving a crossword puzzle for $5 (Kamenica, 2012), to expecting that rewarding teenagers 
with $1 a day will make them reconsider getting pregnant (a nudge proposed in Thaler and Sunstein, 
2009). In other words, policymakers, practitioners and academics interested in nudging need to be 
careful when reading sweeping generalisations about nudging as a governance intervention — 
whether these are about opportunities or the risks that nudging may bring. 
Also, nudging trials and experiments have, so points out the literature reviewed, predominantly been 
carried out to test if nudging may assist in achieving desired collective ends (i.e. these trials and 
experiments are in line with what we refer to as type-2 nudging). As some critically state, in such 
examples the intervention is more like a ‘shove’ than a nudge (cf. Truog, 2012). This may give more 
food for thought to those who fear that nudging is nothing more than another approach of 
governments to take away individuals’ freedom. Also, the nudges we have traced in the literature 
predominantly are additions to existing and more traditional governance interventions, such as taxes 
or direct regulation. This may raise the question whether nudging truly is a fully fledged and 
independent governance strategy, or whether it is nothing more than an approach for revamping 
existing (and poor performing) governance interventions. As other scholars have critically stated, 
‘[n]udges may only make limited difference and focus on them may take away from more difficult but 
more effective reforms’ (Rainford and Tinkler, 2011: 13). 
Finally, nudging evaluations have thus far not compared nudging as a governance strategy or 
instrument to other governance strategies or instruments. In the range of experiments, trials and 
settings reviewed (see Table 1), a nudge was added to an existing governance instrument or a set of 
existing governance instruments, but did not replace an existing governance instrument. As such, it 
remains unclear whether nudging has a comparative advantage over other governance strategies or 
instruments (we traced only one scholarly work that actually compares the performance of nudges 
with the performance of other governance instruments, see Galle, forthcoming). 
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A focus on hard and soft outcomes 
Although some scholars argue that the uncertainty of nudge effectiveness poses unacceptable risks 
(e.g. Bradbury et al., 2013; Goodwin, 2012), we hold the opinion that the baby should not be thrown 
out with the bathwater. The experimental nature of, for instance, the BIT fits a larger trend of 
experimentalist governance that seeks to improve regulatory and governance outcomes through 
localised experimentation (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2011). Nudge-theory at least provides a novel framework 
for policymakers to develop innovative regulatory interventions to play the ‘regulatory game’ between 
regulator and regulatee, where the latter learns to roll with the punches of the former, requiring for 
ongoing regulatory adjustment (cf. De Bruijn et al., 2007). 
When evaluating examples of nudging, scholars may therefore wish to not only address ‘hard 
outcomes’, such as the number of people that quit smoking, or the amount of energy saved. 
Capturing ‘soft outcomes’ may be just as important to evaluate the value of nudging (cf. Darnall and 
Sides, 2008; Lyon and Maxwell, 2007; Rogers and Weber, 2010). What are the exact lessons learned 
from the particular nudge? Have particular collaborations of actors formed that would normally not 
have? Has the nudging experiment provided insights into how particular policies may be improved, 
even without being a success in terms of hard outcomes? Also, what is the value of knowing that a 
particular approach (a particular ‘nudge’) to steering people’s behaviour does not work in achieving 
hard outcomes? Answering such questions would enrich the current evaluations of nudging practice. 
Conclusion 
In this article, we sought to answer four related questions about nudging as a theory and practice. To 
conclude this article, we will briefly answer these questions. 
Whether and how is nudging evaluable as a theory and a practice?  
In as far as nudging may be considered a theory, it is both a political philosophy or ideology and a 
theory of governance practice. As a practice, we have argued, nudging is either one of two things: 
changing actors’ choice architectures to ensure they do not behave against their own self-interest as 
they would have done without the nudge (type-1 nudge), or changing actors’ choice architectures to 
achieve desired collective ends (type-2 nudge).  
As a political philosophy or ideology it cannot, almost by definition, be evaluated. The idea of 
libertarian paternalism may align with academics and policymakers’ epistemology, or it may not. As a 
theory of governance practice nudging should, in principle, be evaluable. However, the theory as 
presented by Thaler and Sunstein (2009) comes with considerable complications and lacunae that 
complicate evaluations. First, there is no clear definition of what makes for a nudge, and how nudging 
differs from other governance interventions. Second, in unpacking Thaler and Sunstein’s theory it has 
become clear that they in fact address two types of nudges, referred to as type-1 and type-2 nudges. 
For both types, however, it remains unclear how these are truly different from any of the governance 
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interventions that had already been identified in the governance literature before the publication of 
Nudge (e.g. Baldwin and Cave, 1999; Salamon, 2001). When seeking to evaluate nudging as a 
governance practice, scholars thus need to clearly define what they consider a nudge. 
In evaluating nudging as a practice, we believe scholars preferably evaluate it against another 
governance strategy or instrument, since this would help to better understand whether nudges 
outperform other governance interventions. We have not found many studies that actually compare 
nudges with other governance interventions (an exception is Galle, forthcoming). This may partly 
have to do with the fact that most studies we reviewed focus on type-2 nudges, which are more likely 
to be additions to existing governance instruments than actual new instruments in themselves. In 
short, evaluations of type-2 nudges are more likely to compare the ‘old’ governance instrument(s) with 
the ‘revamped’ governance instrument(s) when the nudge is or the nudges are added to it. 
To what extent is solid evidence of nudge success available? 
The current evidence of nudging success goes both ways, according to our findings in reviewing the 
literature. In some circumstances, nudging achieves its desired outcomes, while in others it does not. 
This rather unexciting insight holds for both type-1 and type-2 nudges. Nudging successes are often 
presented with many caveats, the most recurring being that the finding holds in a particular setting. 
Scholars carrying out nudging evaluations, tests and trials are often careful in generalising beyond the 
cases they study (policymakers and academics with an ideological preference for nudging, however, 
are more lenient in generalising from these studies). It also often takes some close reading in what a 
nudging success (or for that matter, failure) exactly implies. For example, a relative increase of 
students choosing vegetables over less-healthy alternatives when vegetables are presented more 
attractively does not tell anything about the absolute effect of this nudge, let alone what it does not 
achieve. In one of the examples cited, a relative increase of 23% implied a mere 8.2% absolute 
increase, and although a nudge was in place, the majority of students (56%, down from 64.2%) still 
chose the unhealthy alternatives (Hanks et al., 2013). Therefore, we urge scholars evaluating, trialling 
or testing nudging to be very clear about what their findings exactly show and what they do not show. 
This will help policymakers to make better informed decisions about whether to implement a nudge. 
Strikingly, and as already addressed in answering the previous question, there hardly seems to be 
evidence of nudges being more successful as governance interventions than other governance 
interventions, such as direct regulation, taxes, subsidies or information supply. A fruitful area for future 
research may be such comparative research, because this would give policymakers a broader 
understanding as to where and when nudging may achieve better results than applying another 
governance strategy. 
What is to be considered a nudge success at all? 
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Most of the studies we have reviewed aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of a nudge as compared 
to a situation without that nudge. Studies are, in general, less clear about the efficiency of a nudge — 
i.e. what were the monetary costs or administrative efforts required to achieve the nudge-outcome? 
Another intriguing insight is that although scholars are caught up in fierce polemics about the 
legitimacy, accountability and transparency of nudging as a governance instrument, we have not 
traced any works that actually evaluated these criteria of real-world nudges. In terms of measuring 
nudging outcomes and nudging success, more is at stake in understanding whether nudging may be 
a successful governance intervention than what current evaluations present. Governance evaluations 
have a rich history of looking at multiple evaluation criteria seeking to present a holistic understanding 
of the performance of governance interventions (e.g. Armstrong, 2005; Bovens, 1998; Bovens et al., 
2008; Hodge, 2000; Lundqvist, 1988; Power, 1999; Verhoest et al., 2007).The current focus on 
nudging effectiveness only feels a bit thin, in our opinion. 
Also, current evaluations seek to judge nudging on its ability to achieve ‘hard outcomes’. A lack of 
(evidence of) ‘hard outcomes’ is normally used by those critical to nudging’s political philosophy as a 
reason to write off this governance instrument. Yet, by looking at the ‘soft outcomes’ of real-world 
nudges, valuable lessons may be learned.  
What data and evaluative techniques may assist in evaluating Nudge-theory beyond individual 
cases? 
With nudging being such a novel terrain in real-world governance, we believe that well-crafted 
comparative studies are necessary to better understand the performance of nudges as a governance 
intervention. Experiments from the behavioural sciences provide fruitful ground as starting points for 
hypotheses; however, it remains to be seen if the findings from lab-experiments and quasi-
experiments are replicated in real world settings. Also, with nudging being such novel terrain it is 
unlikely that large-scale cross-sector, cross-time and cross-country studies can already be carried 
out. We expect more from explorative medium-n studies which seek to understand how a particular 
nudge operates in a particular set of contexts (Goertz and Mahony, 2012). In such studies, scholars 
may seek to understand the relative and absolute performance of the nudge (as compared to another 
governance interventions or a situation without the nudge, as well as compared to the goal of the 
nudge), and they may seek to understand whether a nudge achieves sweeping results in achieving 
desired collective ends (type-2 nudge), or in achieving that people are healthier, wealthier and happier 
than they were without the nudge in place (type-1 nudge, following Thaler and Sunstein, 2009). 
We also believe, and once more stress, that scholars interested in evaluating nudges need to be very 
careful in what to consider a nudge. For instance, some ‘nudging’ research lauds the finding that 
overall donations increase if this desired behaviour is somehow recognised ('recognition' is the nudge 
in this example, John and Stoker, 2010). Yet, the broader literature on donations, and philanthropy 
more generally, has for long been aware that recognition is but one of the many mechanisms that 
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drive charitable giving (for a review of the literature, see Bekkers and Wiepking, 2010). We consider 
nudging not so much a revolution, but a logical evolution in the governance landscape (cf. Bradbury et 
al., 2013) — a landscape that has been subject to continuous change (cf. Baldwin et al., 2011; Levi-
Faur, 2011; Sparrow, 2000). As we have discussed in the introduction, nudging has rapidly developed 
from a governance mechanism to a governance virtue. It is now time to evaluate whether the 
mechanism is worthy of this status as a virtue. 
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